(Disclaimer: Not a picture of Pinchas)
Printable PDF available here. Last year’s post on Parshat Pinchas is available here.
Rav Kook (Metziat Katan 146)
Pinchas the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron the Kohen, has turned My anger away from the children of Israel by zealously avenging Me among them, so that I did not destroy the children of Israel because of My vengeance. Therefore, say, “I hereby give him My covenant of peace.”
On these verses, a puzzling midrash tells us that G-d declared “It is right (lit. בדין) that Pinchas claim his reward.” What exactly do our Sages mean to tell us? Why was there any question about Pinchas’ entitlement to reward for his actions?
To understand this midrash, let us turn to a famous question in Jewish philosophy – why were the Egyptians punished for enslaving the Jews if G-d decreed that Avraham’s descendants would be slaves? Many answers are offered to this question. Maimonides suggests that G-d only decreed that Egypt as a collective would enslave the Jewish people, but every single Egyptian maintained the freedom of choice. When that freedom of choice was misused, the Egyptians were deserving of punishment. However, this answer is counterintuitive and does not seem to resolve the problem. If G-d desired that the Jews be enslaved in Egypt, then every individual Egyptian who furthered that purpose was fulfilling the Divine will. What is the logic of distinguishing between G-d’s judgment of individual Egyptians and the collective as a whole?
Let us suggest an alternative solution, one that will also resolve our puzzling midrash regarding Pinchas. Most of the time, G-d commands us to perform actions that are intrinsically good and desirable. And although we are encouraged to fulfil His will for its own sake (lit. לשמה), it is difficult to rise to this lofty level. Thus, our tradition acknowledges the value of performing mitzvot with ulterior motives (lit. שלא לשמה), and in most instances does not censure us for doing so.
However, there are rare instances of actions that are fundamentally wicked, but which G-d permits because they are necessary for the unfolding of His plan for humanity, without which the world could not reach the highest level of perfection. Because these actions are intrinsically wrongful, they are only permitted if performed by one who is conscious that he is fulfilling a Divine mandate. Otherwise, his act remains lawless and contemptible.
One example of this dynamic is the mitzvah of yibbum. Ordinarily, having relations with one’s brother’s wife is a terrible prohibition, punishable by karet. However, when a brother dies without children, G-d’s wisdom pushes aside this prohibition and makes it into a mitzvah. However, the underlying prohibition is still latent, and so our Sages (Gemara Yevamot 39b) teach that if a man who performs yibbum with ulterior motives, it is “as if he encounters one of the arayot.”
The same dynamic was at work when G-d decreed that the Jews be enslaved in Egypt. To cause suffering to any human being, not least an entire nation, is fundamentally a terrible sin. G-d permitted it only as a special dispensation for Israel to be born and fulfill its world-historical mission. The Egyptians should have kept in mind that they were enslaving Israel only in fulfillment of the Divine decree, but the suffering they inflicted was motivated by hatred, not by consciousness of duty. And so in G-d’s eyes it ceased to be a mitzvah and reverted to a terrible sin, one deserving of the most severe punishment.
To come full circle, the same dynamic was also at play in Pinchas’ actions. According to halacha, his execution of Zimri was fundamentally an extra-judicial act of murder, permissible only to one who is a קנאי, a pure-hearted zealot pained by public desecration of G-d’s name. Given that “man sees what is visible to the eyes, while only the Lord sees into the heart” (Shmuel Aleph 16:7), we are thus justified in asking whether Pinchas’ motivations were sincere. In fact, our Sages teach that Pinchas’ contemporaries believed he did not deserve to be rewarded. They did not believe that someone whose ancestors were non-Jewish idol worshippers could muster the necessary purity of intention to be a true zealot. Thus, it was necessary for G-d to attest to Pinchas’ worthiness and declare “It is right (lit. בדין) that Pinchas claim his reward.”
Food for Thought
Nachum Rakover (המטרה המקדשת את האמעציים): One text that could serve as an important authorization to transgress when the motivation is fulfillment of a commandment, is the statement in Tractate Nazir (23b), “A transgression performed with good intention (lishmah) is better than a commandment performed not for its own sake”–with the word lishmah taken as Rashi does, to mean “for the purpose of fulfilling a commandment.” The statement is a bold one, which seems to cut across all categories in one fell stroke and base everything on the nature of one’s motivation. The case offered as proof of this principle is that of Yael, who, the Talmud tells us, had relations with the enemy general Sisera in order to slay him (see Judg. 4:17–22). Hence one cannot help but wonder if it is the Talmud’s position that normally forbidden relations are totally permitted when their purpose is the fulfillment of a commandment?…
In the literature that deals with the issue of transgression in order to fulfill a commandment, there is scarcely any mention at all of the principle, “A transgression performed with good intention is better than a precept performed not for its own sake.” What mention we do find, is exemplified by Rashba’s use of the principle in response to a query on the proper policy concerning punishment of offenders (Resp. Rashba V:238). In the case before him, Rashba recommends moderation and adds, “These matters are determined by the intention of the heart, as you know what is said in Nazir (23b), that ‘a transgression performed with good intention is better than a precept performed not for its own sake.’” Rashba’s responsum does not deal with punishment according to the prescribed law, but rather with punishment demanded by the exigencies of the hour. Such punishment is determined at the sole discretion of the judge. In such instances, then, the evaluation that must be made with regard to possible suspension of punishment has to take into account, among other considerations, the legal system’s view of the judge’s “transgression” performed with good intention….
Violation of the law in order to preserve it seems to receive a somewhat broader interpretation in Hassidic literature. So, for example, R. Ya’akov Yosef of Polanah writes, “We find that the main purpose of G-d’s commandments is that we cleave to His ways, and sometimes the value of a transgression with good intention is very great” (Toledot Ya’akov Yosef, Pareshat Ki Tetze 5). R. Tzadok haKohen of Lublin, in his Tzidkat haTzadik (25) mentions that sometimes love of G-d requires one to sacrifice his soul, as in the case of King David who sought to worship an idol, and the person who violated the Sabbath by gathering wood during Israel’s sojourn in the desert (mekoshesh). Both transgressed with good intention (leshem shamayyim). With regard to a transgression performed with good intention, R. Hayyim of Tzanz distinguishes between ordinary persons and one who transcends human nature, abandoning all regard for his own bodily pleasure (Divrei Hayyim, Pareshat Va’et’hanan, ad init.).
The opposite approach is found in the writings of R. Hayyim of Volozhin, the leading pupil of the Gaon of Vilna. In his work, Nefesh haHayyim (additional notes following Part III, chap. 7), R. Hayyim notes the problematic nature of the statement “gedola aveira lishmah,” which implies that it is permitted to transgress if one’s intention is proper, a statement with potential to undermine all existing order. Therefore, R. Hayyim posits that permission to transgress with good intention applied only prior to the Sinai revelation, but since Sinai, we are bound by the categories of the Torah, and thus the principle has no practical application in our time. In the post-Sinai era, then, even a person becomes convinced that the fulfillment of his legal obligation will cause damage, he is not permitted to abstain, since the reasons for the commandments were not revealed.
Elhanan Wasserman (Or Elhanan, Part II, p. 3) considered the issue of transgression with good intention when consulted about the possible use of force in the struggle for employment of Jewish workers (“avodah Ivrit”) in Eretz Yisrael. In his response, R. Elhanan writes that “it is clear that the authority to permit transgression with good intention was given only to the Sages and not to us… and that if such authority is granted to all who wish to use it, there will remain no room for our holy Torah. Indeed, the communist Bolsheviks also claim that their tactics are for the good of society. But the tactics of terror can only destroy; they can never build, as is written, ‘melekh bemishpat ya’amid eretz–The King by justice upholds the country…’ (Prov. 29:4). From here we learn that the world can be upheld only by justice, and that without justice, it is impossible to remain in the world. For if one side employs terror, the other side will certainly use this method as well.”…
The possibility of violating the law in order to preserve it is a matter of far-reaching and potentially dangerous implications. Due to its explosive nature, the principle has never become part of the mainstream of Jewish law, but has remained a relatively minor tributary.
A Mashal From the Brisker Rav: Rav Soloveitchik offered an analogy to explain an important aspect of the Torah’s attitude toward zealotry. He told the story of a homeowner who was troubled by an infestation of mice in his home. In order to combat the mice, he purchased a cat. In short order, the cat rid the homeowner of the troublesome mice. Rav Soloveitchik observed that both the homeowner and the cat shared the objective of eliminating the mice. However, their underlying motives were very different. The homeowner would have been even happier if he had never experienced the mice infestation. However, the cat’s happiness stems from his engaging hunt and conquest. The cat’s pleasure requires that there be an infestation! Rav Soloveitchik explained that unfortunately, some individuals delight in confrontation and conflict. They masquerade as zealots for the honor of Torah but really enjoy confrontation and strife. The zealot who is acting on Torah principles wishes that his actions would not be required. He responds to a disaster – a public desecration of the Torah’s values. He would prefer that the desecration not occur and his response not be required.
Questions for Discussion
- Other than Pinchas, who else in Tanach has a reputation for zealotry?
- See the excerpt from Elhanan Wasserman above in “Food for Thought.” In light of his insights, does Rav Kook’s teaching have any relevance to the racial unrest currently convulsing cities across America?
- What else is relevant to whether the Torah approves or condemns an act of zealotry?
- Can there be zealotry that does not involve lashing out at or harming people one does not approve of?
- Rav Kook sees yibbum, the Egyptian enslavement and Pinchas lashing out at Zimri/Kozbi as expressions of the same principle. How are these cases similar? How are they different?
- What are some dangers of misplaced zealotry?
