Printable PDF available here. Previous pieces on Parshat Pinchas are available here and here.

Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen 124)

From Rosh Chodesh Nisan until the eighth of the month, the correct law regarding of the daily offering was established. Therefore it was decreed not to eulogize these dates. For the Sadducees maintained that an individual may donate and bring the daily offering. They based this on the verse “The one lamb shall you offer [lit. ta’aseh, in the singular] in the morning…” (Bamidbar 28:4).

To refute the argument of the Sadducees [and prove the accepted tradition that communal offerings must be brought from communal funds] the Sages invoked the verse “Command the children of Israel, and say to them: My food that is presented to Me for offerings made by fire, of a pleasing aroma unto Me, you shall observe [lit. tishmeru, in the plural] to offer to Me in its proper time” (Bamidbar 28:2).

The Talmud records a dispute between the Sadducees and our Sages regarding the daily tamid offering in the Temple. The former maintained that the tamid may be donated by an individual, or purchased with funds donated by an individual. The Sages strongly disagreed and insisted that the tamid must be purchased by the Temple treasury using communal funds. We know of many halachic disputes between the Sages and the Sadducees (among other sectarian groups), but our tradition seems to impute particular significance to this one. Why else would the Sages have established a week-long period of quasi-celebration to commemorate prevailing in this argument? But what exactly is the significance of this machloket? As long as the tamid is offered, why does it matter who pays the bill? It must be that this seemingly technical dispute is really rooted in something much more fundamental.

The Sadducees denied that any sort of special sanctity inheres in the people of Israel as a collective. For them, Israel is merely an amalgamation of independent individuals. From this perspective, the nation of Israel has no independent standing and exists only to serve the interests of its individual members. The Sadducees regarded the community and its endeavors (such as the tamidoffering) as little more than a business partnership, into which one invests in order to receive a ‘return’ on their investment. This is why they maintained that the tamid can be donated by an individual. It seemed nonsensical to them to insist on having the Temple treasury pay for the tamid. After all, they maintained, isn’t the Temple treasury just a large pool of funds donated by different individuals?

But our Sages, from whose waters we drink, knew that this was false. Perhaps for other peoples, there is no metaphysical standing to the concept of nationhood, but Israel is different. The nation of Israel is an eternal entity with its own standing, its own spiritual potentialities, and its own relationship with G-d, one that transcends and exceeds the sum of its individual parts.[1] Collective Israel is a meta-historic entity with its own intrinsic powers, spiritual charisma and covenant with G-d. Thus, our Sages maintained that the tamid offering – like all matters of communal sanctity – must be done in the name of the community itself. No matter how magnificent it is, no individual ‘partner’ can present his or her contribution to G-d in the community’s name.

And for the same reason that the Sadducees could not conceive of the tamid offering as a communal obligation, they also rejected Torah sheba’al peh. Unlike the written Torah, which is fixed in the static reality of parchment and ink, the Oral Torah is written on the hearts and minds of the Jewish people. Transcending generations, it expresses the unique spiritual persona of collective Israel and its distinctive capacity for holiness. Thus, it should not surprise us when our Sages (Gemara Avoda Zara 35a) make the bold claim that rabbinic laws are more beloved by G-d than the Torah itself.[2] For no matter how brightly any individual Jew shines, he is merely a spark in the great flame of Israel’s collective holiness, a holiness that transcends time, history and the constraints of physical reality.

[1] Rav Kook cites a gemara in Bava Metzia (118a) that even if an individual donates materials for communal offerings to the Temple treasury, we do not use them, because “perhaps he will not give it over to the community wholeheartedly.” As Rav Kook explains, we are not concerned about the donor being stingy or having second thoughts. We are concerned that he won’t understand the depth of what it means to give something over to the possession of the metaphysical community of Israel.

[2] In support, Rav Kook references a gemara in Avoda Zara that rabbinic laws are not valid unless they are accepted by the nation as a whole.

Food for Thought

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (Collected Writings, Vol. II, pg. 302): The community exists solely for the sake of its individual members, to provide a channel for concerted effort through which every individual can aspire to human perfection in the purest, fullest measure. The flowering of individual life is the sole basis and criterion for the life of the community. Only the individual can endow his community with a firm foundation and true meaning.

Talmud (Temurah 15a): “Tzibbur aino meis” – the community of Klal Yisroel never dies. If an individual designates a korban and then dies, under certain circumstances the korban can no longer be brought. If the tzibbur designates a korban and all of them die, their descendants are still considered the original tzibbur.

Rav Hirsch (Commentary on the Torah, Shemot 3:17): [I]n each single one of them, the whole nation is represented, each single one of them has the courage and the mission to stand alone against the whole world, and to represent and carry on the nation by himself. In the mouths of the Prophets, other nations habitually are described by the picture of an animal, Israel is pictured preferably as a tree. An animal can be killed with a single pressure of the trigger-finger, or a single stab of the dagger. But a tree reproduces with every part, the possibility of the continuance of life of the whole. Even if the root is severed, a branch, a twig, a bud, a germ, is often sufficient to reinstate the destroyed plant, and to save its continued existence)… Our People does not let itself be destroyed. In each single individual is reproduced the spirit, the courage, the decision of the whole.

Rav Soloveitchik (The Community, Tradition 1978): The very instant we pronounce the word “community” we recall, by sheer association, the ancient controversy between collectivism and individualism. Willy nily the old problem of who and what comes first (metaphysically, not chronologically) arises. Is the individual an independent free entity, who gives up basic aspects of his sovereignty in order to live within a communal framework; or is the reverse true: the individual is born into the. community which, in turn, invests him with certain rights? This perennial controversy is still unresolved. Today the controversy transcends the limits of theoretical debate. People try to resolve it, not by propounding theories or by participating in philosophical symposia in the halls of academia, but by resorting to violence and bloodshed…. The political confrontation between the West and the East [i.e. capitalism and communism] is, ipso facto, a philosophical encounter between one-sided collectivism and one-sided individualism.

Let us ask a simple question: what does Judaism say about this conflict? And let us give a simple answer: Judaism rejects both alternatives: neither theory, per se, is true. Both experiences, that of aloneness, as well as that of togetherness, are inseparable basic elements of the I-awareness. In fact, the greatness of man manifests itself in his inner contradiction, in his dialectical nature, in his being single and unrelated to anyone, as well as in his being thou-related and belonging to a community structure…

The community in Judaism is not a functional-utiltarian, but an ontological one. The community is not just an assembly of people who work together for their mutual benefit, but a metaphysical entity, an individuality; I might say, a living whole. In particular, Judaism has stressed the wholeness and the unity of Knesset Israel, the Jewish community. The latter is not a conglomerate. It is an autonomous entity, endowed with a life of its own. We, for instance, lay claim to Eretz Israel. G-d granted the land to us as a gift. To whom did He pledge the land? Neither to an individual, nor to a partnership consisting of millons of people. He gave it to the Knesset Israel, to the community as an independent unity, as a distinct juridic metaphysical person. He did not promise the land to me, to you, to them; nor did He promise the land to all of us together. Abraham did not receive the land as an individual, but as the father of a future nation. The Owner of the Promised Land is the Knesset Israel, which is a community persona.

Rav Hirsch (Commentary on the Torah, Vayikra 1 pg. 217): A community does not die, the Nation knows no death, and the individual too, in as far as he dedicates the efficacy of his earthly life to the community, rescues the fruit of his life here below over and beyond death, already here below he partakes of immortality. Naturally such a point of view does not look on the idea of a Community as being a union of so and so many persons of so and so much material power. Then the community, the Nation and its efforts would lie, even as the individual does, under the power of death and transitoriness. It looks on the Nation as being the eternal bearer of the eternal moral spiritual Truths of Mankind, as representing the never-dying moral spiritual immortality of Mankind.

Questions for Discussion

1. What does it mean that the Jewish community is a “metaphysical entity”? And what is the scope of this concept? Does it apply only to the entire nation, or even to a local community or a shul?
2. In what sense is the Jewish sense of community different in Israel than outside of Israel?
3. Can someone be a good Jew if they are not a member of a community? Why or why not?
4. Rav Kook claims that unlike the written Torah, the Oral Law “expresses the unique spiritual persona of collective Israel.” What do you think this means?
5. See the excerpts from Rav Hirsch above in “Food for Thought.” Where does he agree with Rav Kook and where does he differ?

(Disclaimer: Not a picture of Pinchas) 

 

Printable PDF available here. Last year’s post on Parshat Pinchas is available here.

Rav Kook (Metziat Katan 146)

Pinchas the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron the Kohen, has turned My anger away from the children of Israel by zealously avenging Me among them, so that I did not destroy the children of Israel because of My vengeance. Therefore, say, “I hereby give him My covenant of peace.”

On these verses, a puzzling midrash tells us that G-d declared “It is right (lit. בדין) that Pinchas claim his reward.” What exactly do our Sages mean to tell us? Why was there any question about Pinchas’ entitlement to reward for his actions?

To understand this midrash, let us turn to a famous question in Jewish philosophy – why were the Egyptians punished for enslaving the Jews if G-d decreed that Avraham’s descendants would be slaves? Many answers are offered to this question. Maimonides suggests that G-d only decreed that Egypt as a collective would enslave the Jewish people, but every single Egyptian maintained the freedom of choice. When that freedom of choice was misused, the Egyptians were deserving of punishment. However, this answer is counterintuitive and does not seem to resolve the problem. If G-d desired that the Jews be enslaved in Egypt, then every individual Egyptian who furthered that purpose was fulfilling the Divine will. What is the logic of distinguishing between G-d’s judgment of individual Egyptians and the collective as a whole?

Let us suggest an alternative solution, one that will also resolve our puzzling midrash regarding Pinchas. Most of the time, G-d commands us to perform actions that are intrinsically good and desirable. And although we are encouraged to fulfil His will for its own sake (lit. לשמה), it is difficult to rise to this lofty level. Thus, our tradition acknowledges the value of performing mitzvot with ulterior motives (lit. שלא לשמה), and in most instances does not censure us for doing so.

However, there are rare instances of actions that are fundamentally wicked, but which G-d permits because they are necessary for the unfolding of His plan for humanity, without which the world could not reach the highest level of perfection. Because these actions are intrinsically wrongful, they are only permitted if performed by one who is conscious that he is fulfilling a Divine mandate. Otherwise, his act remains lawless and contemptible.

One example of this dynamic is the mitzvah of yibbum. Ordinarily, having relations with one’s brother’s wife is a terrible prohibition, punishable by karet. However, when a brother dies without children, G-d’s wisdom pushes aside this prohibition and makes it into a mitzvah. However, the underlying prohibition is still latent, and so our Sages (Gemara Yevamot 39b) teach that if a man who performs yibbum with ulterior motives, it is “as if he encounters one of the arayot.”

The same dynamic was at work when G-d decreed that the Jews be enslaved in Egypt. To cause suffering to any human being, not least an entire nation, is fundamentally a terrible sin. G-d permitted it only as a special dispensation for Israel to be born and fulfill its world-historical mission. The Egyptians should have kept in mind that they were enslaving Israel only in fulfillment of the Divine decree, but the suffering they inflicted was motivated by hatred, not by consciousness of duty. And so in G-d’s eyes it ceased to be a mitzvah and reverted to a terrible sin, one deserving of the most severe punishment.

To come full circle, the same dynamic was also at play in Pinchas’ actions. According to halacha, his execution of Zimri was fundamentally an extra-judicial act of murder, permissible only to one who is a קנאי, a pure-hearted zealot pained by public desecration of G-d’s name. Given that “man sees what is visible to the eyes, while only the Lord sees into the heart” (Shmuel Aleph 16:7), we are thus justified in asking whether Pinchas’ motivations were sincere. In fact, our Sages teach that Pinchas’ contemporaries believed he did not deserve to be rewarded. They did not believe that someone whose ancestors were non-Jewish idol worshippers could muster the necessary purity of intention to be a true zealot. Thus, it was necessary for G-d to attest to Pinchas’ worthiness and declare “It is right (lit. בדין) that Pinchas claim his reward.”

Food for Thought

Nachum Rakover (המטרה המקדשת את האמעציים): One text that could serve as an important authorization to transgress when the motivation is fulfillment of a commandment, is the statement in Tractate Nazir (23b), “A transgression performed with good intention (lishmah) is better than a commandment performed not for its own sake”–with the word lishmah taken as Rashi does, to mean “for the purpose of fulfilling a commandment.” The statement is a bold one, which seems to cut across all categories in one fell stroke and base everything on the nature of one’s motivation. The case offered as proof of this principle is that of Yael, who, the Talmud tells us, had relations with the enemy general Sisera in order to slay him (see Judg. 4:17–22). Hence one cannot help but wonder if it is the Talmud’s position that normally forbidden relations are totally permitted when their purpose is the fulfillment of a commandment?…

In the literature that deals with the issue of transgression in order to fulfill a commandment, there is scarcely any mention at all of the principle, “A transgression performed with good intention is better than a precept performed not for its own sake.” What mention we do find, is exemplified by Rashba’s use of the principle in response to a query on the proper policy concerning punishment of offenders (Resp. Rashba V:238). In the case before him, Rashba recommends moderation and adds, “These matters are determined by the intention of the heart, as you know what is said in Nazir (23b), that ‘a transgression performed with good intention is better than a precept performed not for its own sake.’” Rashba’s responsum does not deal with punishment according to the prescribed law, but rather with punishment demanded by the exigencies of the hour. Such punishment is determined at the sole discretion of the judge. In such instances, then, the evaluation that must be made with regard to possible suspension of punishment has to take into account, among other considerations, the legal system’s view of the judge’s “transgression” performed with good intention….

Violation of the law in order to preserve it seems to receive a somewhat broader interpretation in Hassidic literature. So, for example, R. Ya’akov Yosef of Polanah writes, “We find that the main purpose of G-d’s commandments is that we cleave to His ways, and sometimes the value of a transgression with good intention is very great” (Toledot Ya’akov Yosef, Pareshat Ki Tetze 5). R. Tzadok haKohen of Lublin, in his Tzidkat haTzadik (25) mentions that sometimes love of G-d requires one to sacrifice his soul, as in the case of King David who sought to worship an idol, and the person who violated the Sabbath by gathering wood during Israel’s sojourn in the desert (mekoshesh). Both transgressed with good intention (leshem shamayyim). With regard to a transgression performed with good intention, R. Hayyim of Tzanz distinguishes between ordinary persons and one who transcends human nature, abandoning all regard for his own bodily pleasure (Divrei Hayyim, Pareshat Va’et’hanan, ad init.).

The opposite approach is found in the writings of R. Hayyim of Volozhin, the leading pupil of the Gaon of Vilna. In his work, Nefesh haHayyim (additional notes following Part III, chap. 7), R. Hayyim notes the problematic nature of the statement “gedola aveira lishmah,” which implies that it is permitted to transgress if one’s intention is proper, a statement with potential to undermine all existing order. Therefore, R. Hayyim posits that permission to transgress with good intention applied only prior to the Sinai revelation, but since Sinai, we are bound by the categories of the Torah, and thus the principle has no practical application in our time. In the post-Sinai era, then, even a person becomes convinced that the fulfillment of his legal obligation will cause damage, he is not permitted to abstain, since the reasons for the commandments were not revealed.

Elhanan Wasserman (Or Elhanan, Part II, p. 3) considered the issue of transgression with good intention when consulted about the possible use of force in the struggle for employment of Jewish workers (“avodah Ivrit”) in Eretz Yisrael. In his response, R. Elhanan writes that “it is clear that the authority to permit transgression with good intention was given only to the Sages and not to us… and that if such authority is granted to all who wish to use it, there will remain no room for our holy Torah. Indeed, the communist Bolsheviks also claim that their tactics are for the good of society. But the tactics of terror can only destroy; they can never build, as is written, ‘melekh bemishpat ya’amid eretz–The King by justice upholds the country…’ (Prov. 29:4). From here we learn that the world can be upheld only by justice, and that without justice, it is impossible to remain in the world. For if one side employs terror, the other side will certainly use this method as well.”…

The possibility of violating the law in order to preserve it is a matter of far-reaching and potentially dangerous implications. Due to its explosive nature, the principle has never become part of the mainstream of Jewish law, but has remained a relatively minor tributary.

A Mashal From the Brisker Rav: Rav Soloveitchik offered an analogy to explain an important aspect of the Torah’s attitude toward zealotry.  He told the story of a homeowner who was troubled by an infestation of mice in his home.  In order to combat the mice, he purchased a cat.  In short order, the cat rid the homeowner of the troublesome mice.  Rav Soloveitchik observed that both the homeowner and the cat shared the objective of eliminating the mice.  However, their underlying motives were very different.  The homeowner would have been even happier if he had never experienced the mice infestation.  However, the cat’s happiness stems from his engaging hunt and conquest.  The cat’s pleasure requires that there be an infestation! Rav Soloveitchik explained that unfortunately, some individuals delight in confrontation and conflict.  They masquerade as zealots for the honor of Torah but really enjoy confrontation and strife. The zealot who is acting on Torah principles wishes that his actions would not be required.  He responds to a disaster – a public desecration of the Torah’s values.  He would prefer that the desecration not occur and his response not be required.

Questions for Discussion

1. Other than Pinchas, who else in Tanach has a reputation for zealotry?
2. See the excerpt from Elhanan Wasserman above in “Food for Thought.” In light of his insights, does Rav Kook’s teaching have any relevance to the racial unrest currently convulsing cities across America?
3. What else is relevant to whether the Torah approves or condemns an act of zealotry?
4. Can there be zealotry that does not involve lashing out at or harming people one does not approve of?
5. Rav Kook sees yibbum, the Egyptian enslavement and Pinchas lashing out at Zimri/Kozbi as expressions of the same principle. How are these cases similar? How are they different?
6. What are some dangers of misplaced zealotry?

Printable PDF available here.

Midot haRe’iah (ערך סבלנות)

The flame of pure faith, from which life derives its majesty, can easily become dampened by tolerance for the beliefs of Jews who are outside the fold (lit. סבלנות בדעות). However, when tolerance comes from a pure and refined heart, this danger is not present. On the contrary, the sacred flame of faith expands and is magnified.

This is because true tolerance is bound up with ardent faith and recognition that no soul can be entirely devoid of the light of holiness. The vitality of the Living G-d[1] (lit. אלוקים חיים) permeates every stratum of existence –even where a person’s thought and action seem to manifest only rebellion and denial. Deep within the heart and soul of every member of Israel – even those who are afflicted with kefirah and consumed by doubt – lies a holy and concealed light. True tolerance comes not from apathy or indifference, but from knowledge and faith in this holy truth.

When one who possesses sacred tolerance gazes upon all of Israel, he sees their inner charm and embraces the holiness concealed within them. As the prophet Michah proclaimed (2:12)– אָסֹף אֶאֱסֹף יַעֲקֹב כֻּלָּךְ, “I will surely gather, O Jacob, all of you.”

Orot haKodesh(חלק ג, צפיה לישועה אות יג)

When ahavat Hashem reaches its highest level, it flows outward and finds expression in zealotry (lit.קנאת ה׳). Love ceases to be a passive emotional experience and becomes a dynamic, active force that impresses itself on all of dimensions of life’s existence, in both thought and action…[2]

Both Pinchas and Eliahu – who the midrash teaches were one and the same[3]–embodied this trait of kinah motivated by ahavat Hashem. However, their zeal was not simply a function of their own personal religiosity. It flowed from a spiritual power possessed by the people of Israel as a collective. Am Yisrael fiercely resists any adulteration, any attempt to tamper with its sacred heritage by introducing foreign elements.[4]G-d Himself is described as ‘a zealous G-d’ (lit. אל קנא), Who cuts down any attempt at sharing His glory with idolatry. As Moshe put it (Devarim 32:12) “So the Lord guided them alone, and there was no alien deity with Him;”ה׳ בדד ינחנו ואין עמו אל נכר.

At this point in history, Israel is not yet able to implement zealotry on an individual level. But eventual success is guaranteed, by virtue of our collective aptitude for kinat Hashem… The eventual result of this kinah, in its pure and appropriate form, will be not strife and violence, but life and peace.[5]As Isaiah proclaims (9:6) לְמַרְבֵּה הַמִּשְׂרָה וּלְשָׁלוֹם אֵין קֵץ עַל כִּסֵּא דָוִד וְעַל מַמְלַכְתּוֹ לְהָכִין אֹתָהּ וּלְסַעֲדָהּ בְּמִשְׁפָּט וּבִצְדָקָה מֵעַתָּה וְעַד עוֹלָם קִנְאַת יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת תַּעֲשֶׂה זֹּאת.

Food for Thought

Rav Yehuda Amital (Sichah– Is the Zeal of Pinchas to be Emulated?): In our generation the problem is that people are generally apathetic; nothing shakes their equilibrium. They view others desecrating Shabbat in public, and feel no twinge in their heart. Once I was in the United States and I saw a Christian priest on television, talking about ‘the Mother, the Son…’ etc. I was completely shaken by this kind of talk. I couldn’t listen to it. The people sitting in the room, though observant Jews, continued drinking their coffee, sensing nothing…. People become apathetic and nothing shocks them. We must feel zeal in certain areas. This does not mean that our zeal need necessarily be demonstrated outwardly – sometimes outward demonstrations only bring harm; one must know, from a halakhic point of view, when rebuke is necessary, when it is permissible, and when it is forbidden. However, all of that is only on the outside. Inside ourselves, we dare not remain apathetic. We must be zealous for God.

Sefer haTanya (Likutei Amarim, Chapter 10): For the perfectly righteous person hates whatever comes from the sitra achra with absolute hatred, by virtue of his great love for G‑d and His holiness… For the two are antithetical one to the other. Thus King David writes (Tehillim 139:21-22) “Did I not hate Your enemies, O Lord? With those who rise up against You, I quarrel. I hate them with utmost hatred, I count them my enemies. Search me and know my heart.”… Hence, according to one’s love for G‑d is the extent of one’s hatred towards the sitra achra and contempt for evil.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks (Covenant & Conversation 5772): Pinchas gave his name to the parsha in which Moses asks God to appoint a successor. R. Menahem Mendel, the Rebbe of Kotzk, asked why Pinchas, hero of the hour, was not appointed instead of Joshua. His answer was that a zealot cannot be a leader. That requires patience, forbearance and respect for due process. The zealots within besieged Jerusalem in the last days of the Second Temple played a significant part in the city’s destruction. They were more intent on fighting one another than the Romans outside the city walls. Nothing in the religious life is more risk-laden than zeal, and nothing more compelling than the truth God taught Elijah, that God is not to be found in the use of force but in the still, small voice that turns the sinner from sin. As for vengeance, that belongs to God alone.

Rav David Silverberg (Yeshivat Har Etzion, Virtual Beit Midrash): Numerous sources identify Pinchas with Eliyahu… the prophet during the First Commonwealth who zealously opposed the worship of Ba’al in the Northern Kingdom of Israel, and even killed the prophets of Ba’al at Mount Carmel. [From t]he Midrash… [i]t appears that God criticized Eliyahu… for his zealotry in opposing the worship of Ba’al at the time of Achav and Izevel. The obvious question arises, why did God now express disapproval of Pinchas’ zealous act, after emphatically congratulating Pinchas and even promising him reward for his zealotry?

Mussar Ha-nevi’im suggests an answer by noting the different contexts of these two acts of zealotry. Pinchas’ act at Shittim occurred during Bnei Yisrael’s travels in the wilderness, when they lived a miraculous existence and were accompanied at all times by the Divine Presence… Under such conditions, Pinchas’ violent response to Zimri and Kozbi’s act was, in principle, appropriate. When Bnei Yisrael lived on an especially high spiritual level and the Divine Presence was palpable, a grievous sinful act such as the one committed by Zimri and Kozbi warranted an extreme response. In Eliyahu’s time, however, the people were very far from Torah observance and from the Divine Presence. Their condition bore little resemblance to the atmosphere of sanctity felt in the Israelite camp in the wilderness, and thus a softer and more patient approach was warranted.

This insight reminds us that different circumstances and contexts warrant different responses. Solutions used effectively in one situation are not necessarily appropriate for solving the same problem in a different situation. Eliyahu’s failure was reacting in the times of Achav and Izevel the same way Pinchas reacted in the times of Moshe Rabbenu. Every generation and set of circumstances offers its unique challenges and requires different strategies, and so measures that were appropriate at the time of Ba’al Pe’or were not necessarily appropriate at the time of Achav and Izevel.

Questions for Discussion

1. What are some of the dangers of religious zealotry?
2. Take a look at 22:13 of Sefer Yehoshua, where Pinchas figures in a major conflict between the shevatim. Does Pinchas’ conduct seem consistent or inconsistent with the way he acts in this week’s parshah?
3. What are some guidelines for distinguishing between healthy and unhealthy forms of religious zealotry?
4. What kind of people are attracted to religious zealotry?
5. In “Food For Thought” above, Rav Silverberg argues that religious zealotry is not appropriate in every generation. What kind of generation do you think we live in? Why?
6. Another place we find קנאהmentioned in the Torah is the parsha of sotah. Does that have any connection to the target of Pinchas’ zealotry?

[1]See Devarim 5:22 and 30:20; Yehoshua 3:10, and Shmuel Aleph 17:17 and 36 for examples of this appellation for G-d.

[2]At first glance, the connection Rav Kook draws between ahavat Hashem and zealotry is counterintuitive. We usually associate zealotry with anger, righteous rage and fear of G-d. Consider, however, that Avraham Avinu was the אוהב ה׳par excellence. And what zealous act did he carry out against his father’s idols? See also Tehillim 97:10 – אוהבי ה׳ שנאו רע– and the excerpt from Tanya below.

[3]There are various ways to interpret this tradition. Some take it literally and maintain that Pinchas and Eliahu were literally the same person, and that Pinchas lived an extraordinarily long life. Others maintain that the midrash is pointing out a spiritual connection (or a gilgul neshamot, to use kabbalistic terminology) between the two of them.

[4]Rav Kook cites the liturgy of the brit milah in which Eliahu is referred to מלאך הברית. This is based on the Zohar’s teaching that Eliahu’s spirit attends every brit milah performed by the Jewish people. Interestingly, Rav Kook seems to learn that this is not a punishment/rebuke for Eliahu’s claim to G-d that ‘כי עזבו את בריתך,’ as is usually understood. Rather, Eliahu attends every brit because brit milah guarantees the sacred character of the Jewish pedigree and symbolizes our unique relationship with G-d. These are exactly the values which Eliahu zealously pursued.

[5]See also the last Mishnah in Eduyot – “The Sages say that Eliahu will come neither to distance [people of improper lineage] nor to bring near [people of proper lineage who have been unfairly maligned], but to make peace in the world, for it is said, “Behold I send to you Eliahu the prophet…he shall turn the hearts of fathers to children and the hearts of children to their fathers” (Malachi 3:23-2).